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The Prospects of Pension Fund
Socialism
William H. Simont
A substantialportion of corporateshareholdingsin the United States
is held by pensionfunds that secure retirement benefitsfor broadsegments
of the workforce. A number of commentators have argued that the assets
secured by these pension funds should be used to promote the creation of a
more democratic and egalitarian economy. Specifically, pension assets
could be invested in projects that are deemed socially worthwhile, wielded
in strategic "corporate campaigns" against companies resisting unionization, or directed toward allowing workers to obtain control over their own
companies. This program of employing pension assets in the pursuit of a
more democratic economy-referred to by the author as "pension fund
socialism"-is hindered by a number of obstacles arising both from within
the structure of pension funds and from the larger legal, economic and
political landscape. For instance, there are legitimate reasons to limit the
risk pension funds carry, thus narrowingthe range of investment opportunities open to the funds. Also restrictingthe potential of pension fund socialism are the conflicting interests among different sectors of the
workforce, such as those existing between current employees and retirees.
The author's thesis is that the prospects of pension fund socialism are substantial but not as bright as many proponents have suggested.
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Classical political economy portrayed the function of the capitalist
class as saving and investing. This is an undeniably important role, and
it seemed implausible to the classicists that, in a capitalist society, the
great masses of people with minimal financial assets and barely enough
income for current needs could participate in these activities. The fact
that the performance of this socially valuable role entailed a socially regrettable distribution of wealth and income was viewed either as a necessary evil or as a reason to reject the entire capitalist framework of private
ownership and market allocation of capital.'
Recent developments in economic theory, reflecting on contemporary realities, have provided us with a different vision of the institutionalization of the savings and investment role. This vision locates savings
and investment not in the class structure, but in the life cycle.2 In early
adulthood, people tend to save negatively (borrow) to finance education
and set up households. As their careers proceed, they save positively,
paying back their loans and accruing assets in anticipation of retirement.
In retirement, they draw down their savings. This vision has considerably more benign distributive connotations than the classical one. The
privileges and responsibilities of saving are distributed throughout the
population. And there is no exploitation of savers by non-savers, since
the two roles are performed by the same people at appropriate phases of
their lives.
If you had to choose between the class vision and the lifecycle one as
a description of the contemporary western economies, you should choose
the class vision. But post-World War II policies encouraging pension
savings have added some credence to the lifecycle vision. A substantial
portion of capital claims in advanced economies is held by public and
private funds that secure retirement benefits for broad segments of their
workforces. For example, nearly one-third of the value of equity securities of American business is held by pension funds.' This fraction is
likely to increase in the future.4
1. E.g.,
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Moreover, the lifecycle vision has served as an inspiration for reform. It has occurred to some that the road to socialism, or some substantial socialization of the investment process, might lie in an expanded,
publicly regulated system of pension finance. 5 In the United States such
notions have surfaced occasionally in debates over the "social investment" of pension funds or over "employee stock ownership" pension
plans ("ESOPs"). 6 In Europe during the 1970s and 1980s, quite ambitious plans for "wage-earner funds" (not necessarily, but sometimes tied
to pension finance) were debated vigorously. 7 Recently, some proposals
for the privatization of formerly communist East European economies
have included provisions for state transfer of responsibilities to fund retirement benefits and assets to private pension plans.8
"Pension fund socialism" probably is not the term best calculated to
evoke broad enthusiasm for measures of this sort, and it is potentially
misleading to the extent that it suggests that these plans are uniformly
radical. But the term seems appropriate since, at the most general level,
the plans are animated by the traditional socialist ideal of a more egalitarian and democratic economy; and they pursue this goal in a manner
long associated with socialism-placing capital ownership in the hands
of the working and middle classes. Moreover, the work of the politically
centrist management theorist Peter Drucker in popularizing the term
may have eroded its more radical connotations. 9
On a more concrete level, some of the discussions on this issue in
America and Western Europe were prompted by the economic dislocations of the past two decades. In America, large, unanticipated employment and wage losses-associated with deindustrialization in the
manufacturing sector and deregulation in the transportation and communications sectors-made established methods of ensuring job and wage
security through employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements seem inadequate.10 Forms of worker ownership, facilitated by tax
subsidies via the pension system, struck some as a promising response to
these inadequacies, since worker-owners would be more careful and less
5.

See generally PETER

CIALISM CAME TO AMERICA

DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION: How PENSION FUND SO-

(1976);

(1989).
6. See generally JOSEPH BLASI,
JEREMY RIFKIN & RANDY BARBER,
POLITICS IN THE 1980s (1978).
7.

ROBERT DEATON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSIONS
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF?

(1988);

THE NORTH WILL RISE AGAIN: PENSIONS, POWER, AND

PETER SWENSON, FAIR SHARES: UNIONS, PAY, AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN AND WEST

129-223 (1989).
8. OLIVIER BLANCHARD ET AL., REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE 54-56 (1991).
9. See DRUCKER, supra note 5.
10. See, e.g., Deborah Groban Olson, Union Experiences With Worker Ownership: Legal and
PracticalIssues Raised by ESOPs, TRASOPs, Stock Purchases,and Co-operatives, 1982 WIS. L. REV.
729, 732-35.
GERMANY
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opportunistic about laying off their fellows than would investor-owners."
The debates over "wage-earner funds" in West Germany and Sweden focused on a distinct set of problems. One problem was the difficulty
that the powerful national labor confederations in these countries with
centralized union structures experienced in developing a strategy to
maintain productivity-based wage growth without causing job losses or
inflation or crippling investment incentives. High wage demands risked
inflation or unemployment (or both), but wage restraint might allow capitalists to capture most of the benefits of price stability through higher
profits. The state or the labor movement might try to recapture these
benefits through exactions on the higher profits, but such exactions
risked an undesirable reduction in investment. The wage-earner fund
idea would combine wage restraint with profit exactions, but would reinvest exactions on a long-term basis on behalf of the workers. In theory,
this would offset any reduction in investment by capitalists due to the

exactions. 12
In this paper, I will consider the principal constraints on the fulfillment of the egalitarian and democratic aspirations of socialism through
pension reform, especially in the United States. Part I discusses the issues of investment risk that particularly concern pension plans. Part II
identifies and analyzes conflicts of interest that may develop among pension plan beneficiaries. Part III examines the limits of worker control
over their pension assets. Part IV explores the redistributive potential of
pension fund socialism. Part V identifies background economic factors
that influence the viability of pension fund socialism. I conclude that the
promise of pension fund socialism is significant, but more modest than
many proponents suggest.
I
RISK

In conventional capitalist theory, both the control and the financial
return associated with ownership are functions of risk. Owners exercise
control over their capital to limit the risks to their interests. The return
they receive is in substantial part compensation for the risk they bear.
Although classical socialism was quite hostile to this idea both descriptively and normatively, most discussions of pension fund socialism seem
to accept it. 13 Pension fund socialism is a form of market socialism, and
market socialism seems committed to allocating, in accordance with
ownership, at least some of the risks that markets create.
The most fundamental issues of risk in pension plan design revolve
11.
12.
13.

See id.
See SWENSON, supra note 7, at 129-223.
See DRUCKER, supra note 5, at 166.
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around the problems of how much risk should be tolerated and how risk
should be allocated among pension plan beneficiaries.
A.

14
Defined Benefit Versus Defined Contribution

A defined benefit plan promises a specified benefit on retirementfor example, an annual payment during retirement equal to one percent
of average salary during a worker's last three years multiplied by total
years of service with her company.t 5 By contrast, a defined contribution
plan simply promises a specified pension fund contribution and guarantees the worker accumulated contributions and earnings (or losses) on
them. 16
Under a defined benefit plan the worker does not bear any investment risk associated with the fund. The promised benefits are insured by
the employer, an insurance company and/or a government agency. If
the fund's investment performance is not adequate to pay promised benefits, the insurer pays them. Under such a plan, the economic premise of
worker control-worker investment risk-is absent.' 7 Here the insurer
bears the residual risk (and is entitled to any assets above those necessary
to fund benefits) and according to conventional premises, should control
how the funds are invested. It is thus significant to any ambitious project
of pension fund socialism that industrial unions have tended to bargain
for defined benefit plans and have pushed for federal insurance of such
plans. Apparently, they have preferred security to control.
But there is a strong case to be made-apartfrom the goal of giving
employees control over their pension assets-that defined contribution
plans would be a socially preferable structure for a pension system with
broad coverage. First, workers pay for the security associated with defined benefit plans with lower expected benefit levels. An employer
should be willing to make larger current pension contributions where, as
in a defined contribution plan, she bears no continuing investment risk
(and is not required to pay some other insurer to bear this risk).
Second, and far more important, the egalitarian goals of the socialist
vision are ultimately more compatible with defined contribution plans.
Society as a whole cannot escape investment risk. If some are to be im14.
1989).
15.

16.

See generally DAN MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS

OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 105-19 (6th ed.

Id. at 105.

Id. at 112.

17. This is so, at least, to the extent that benefits are completely and effectively insured. So
long as workers' benefits are implicitly conditioned on the solvency of the firm or insurance com-

pany, workers bear some risk. However, in the United States the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [PBGC] insurance system covers about 80% of benefits in most private employer-defined
benefit plans and, while there remains some risk that it will be unable to pay all insured claims, the
system surely alleviates worker concern about employer solvency. See RICHARD IPPOLITO, THE
ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 37-38, 65-69 (1989).
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munized from it, others must be saddled with it. If capitalists bear the
risk, they will demand compensation for it. Of course, a system limited to
defined contribution plans still would produce inequality; less successful
funds would have lower returns than more successful ones. But in such a
system the high returns would be less socially concentrated and less correlated with other dimensions of social status (such as non-pension
wealth, class background and occupational prestige) than they would be
in a system where a small class assumes primary responsibility for investment risk.
Moreover, public insurance arrangements for defined benefit plans
are prone to unfair cross-subsidization of different classes of workers.
Cross-subsidization among the beneficiaries of different defined benefit
plans may occur because of the political or administrative difficulty of
calibrating insurance premiums to risk. This seems to have been the case
with the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation system, under which a
large majority of claims to date have come from auto and steel workers,
at the expense of workers in other industries.'" Cross-subsidization of
defined benefit beneficiaries as a class by the rest of the population also
may occur if insurance funds prove insolvent and governments feel compelled to bail them out with general revenues; many fear that this will
happen in the case of the PBGC, which is insolvent by some estimates.' 9
By contrast, defined contribution plans have the advantage that they do
not encourage arbitrary cross-subsidization.
On the other hand, paternalistic and social welfare concerns weigh
against excessive risk-bearing, and defined contribution plans subject
beneficiaries to greater risk than do defined benefit plans. Some fraction
of a retired worker's income should include relatively riskless2" benefits of
the sort that Social Security and defined benefit plans now provide.
Hence, only a portion of the typical worker's estate should be invested in
the type of claims that involve the risk associated with ownership.
B.

Concentration Versus Diversification2

The second major risk issue concerns the diversification of funds
that secure workers' pension claims. Funds that invest in a representative variety of businesses are less risky than those that invest in a single
business or a single industry. Other things being equal, the economic
returns to diversified funds will have less variance than returns to undiversified ones. Concentrated funds, on the other hand, will expose ben18.
19.
20.
of these
21.

Id. at 41-45.
Id. at 41-48.
Of course, there is no such thing as a completely riskless claim. For example, the security
benefits depends on the performance of the economy.
See generally RICHARD BREALY &

FINANCE 105-19 (4th ed. 1991).

STEWART MEYERS, PRINCIPLES

OF CORPORATE
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eficiaries to large losses and will produce more inequality among
beneficiaries. Moreover, since workers already are subject to financial
risks of wage or job loss in the event their employer enterprise or industry performs poorly, employees would be taking an additional-and potentially substantial-risk if they invested their pension assets in their
own firm or industry. The diversification norm suggests that they invest
their pension assets elsewhere.
On the other hand, investment diversification dilutes control in a
way that strains the democratic goal of pension fund socialism. From
the democratic perspective, beneficiary investment and hence control
should be focused on the institutions that most affect beneficiaries. This
suggests funds should be concentrated in the enterprises where beneficiaries work, as do ESOPs. But such investments would be riskier and
would produce more inequality (i.e., there would be more variance in
their returns) than would more diversified ones. 2 On the other hand, to
the extent that the fund seeks to reduce risk by diversifying, it fragments
its holdings in a way that gives it relatively little control over individual
investments. A sufficiently large fund might achieve both diversification
and significant control over individual investments, but a fund so large
would have a large number of beneficiaries spread among many enterprises, and it would hence be difficult to achieve meaningful democratic
control of the fund itself.
The point that efficient allocation of risk creates a tradeoff between
economic democracy and worker financial welfare must be qualified,
however. There are important economic reasons why it may be desirable
for workers to bear the risks associated with investments concentrated in
their own firms. First, only investments focused in his own enterprise are
likely to enhance a worker's productivity incentives. In addition, more
concentrated investments increase both the incentive and the ability of
investors (whether trustees or the workers themselves) to monitor managers; and if such monitoring leads to improved firm performance, the
returns may compensate for the added risk. Third, even while they increase an employee's investment risk, concentrated investments may mitigate another economic risk-job loss. A fixed wage employment
contract generally leads to larger and quicker layoffs in the event of product market downturn than does a contract that makes wages contingent
on profits. Thus, it may make sense for workers to trade fixed wages for
profit shares. Enterprise-focused funds may be good vehicles for doing
SO.
22. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA], 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461, requires trustees to diversify investments in covered funds and provides that non-ESOP defined contribution ("individual account") plans may invest no more than 10% of their assets in the employer
enterprise. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1104(a)(l)(c), 1107(a)(2) (1988).
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Two key variables that affect the viability of enterprise-focused
funds are the capital intensity of the firm and the age composition of its
workforce. The more capital intensive the firm, the less likely worker
savings can play a major role in financing it. Still, even in the more extreme cases of capital intensity, there often will be some role for worker
investment. One might have thought that the steel industry would be
one of the worst candidates for worker finance. That industry always has
been capital intensive; and recent technological changes have increased
capital needs while reducing workforce size. Despite this, Weirton Steel
was an outstanding example of a sizeable, 100% employee-owned industrial firm. In fact, as of November 1990, approximately 50,000 members
of the United Steelworkers union participated in employee stock ownership plans.2 3 This may, however, be a transitional phenomenon related
to the traumatic circumstances of the steel industry of recent years. In
Weirton Steel's case, after re-achieving profitability, the company sold a
substantial minority interest to the public.2 4 In the long term, the less
capital intensive firms seem to be the more plausible candidates for the
more ambitious worker ownership plans.
Older workforces are less plausible candidates for worker ownership
than younger or middle-aged ones. Workers typically will want to cash
in their shares on (or before) retirement, and under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA], an ESOP must allow them to do
so." Unless there are enough junior workers to buy out the retirees,
their shares will have to be sold to outsiders.
C.

Background Investment Risk

The extent to which investments expose workers to risk depends in
part on the nature of a country's business environment. Notably, business risk is partly a function of government policy and industrial structure. Government policies that promote or tolerate price and currency
exchange rate volatility and unrestricted foreign competition tend to create more business risk than policies aimed at monetary stability and
cushioning competitive pressures. Industrial structures in which volatile,
impersonal capital markets play the major monitoring role, and in which
seriously troubled firms are left to a costly, traumatic bankruptcy process, involve more risk than structures in which firms linked in consortia
monitor one another and provide some mutual insurance against the
more traumatic effects of restructuring. In the United States, government policies and industrial structure tolerate a relatively high degree of
23.

Steve Newman & Mike Yoffee, Steelworkers and Employee Ownership, 3 J. OF EMPLOYEE

OWNERSHIP L. & FIN. 51, 51 (1991).

24. Stock Offering by Weirton Steel, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1989, at D4.
25. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 409(h), 4975(e)(7) (West Supp. 1993).
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business risk.26
To the extent that the United States adopts economic policies that
moderate business risk in general, policies encouraging enterprise- or industry-focused investment of retirement funds might become more plausible. However, policies that constrain economic instability may produce
great inefficiencies, as the experiences of the former East European communist economies show. Yet, Japan's example suggests that this is not
inevitable."
II
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The relative roles of democratic and paternalistic principles in
American pension law currently are disputed. Proponents of economic
democracy believe that the control associated with pension equity should
be exercised through beneficiary vote. However, most funds are structured so that trustees exercise control according to their own judgments
of beneficiary interests. The Department of Labor, which enforces fiduciary duties under ERISA, insists that even where plans purport to bind a
trustee to the beneficiaries' instructions, ERISA sometimes may require
the trustee or investment manager to substitute his own paternalistic
judgment.28 This perspective presupposes a high degree of unity of interest among beneficiaries; it does not contemplate separate analysis and
action with respect to each beneficiary's interest, but a single collective
judgment and response.
Although voting permits differential responses among pension fund
beneficiaries, the democracy perspective still requires a substantial degree
of shared interests. Workers cannot constitute a viable political community without a significant degree of shared interests. Conflicting interests
26. See generally Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J.
ECON. Lrr. 1 (1990); David I. Levine & Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation,Productivity, and the
Firm's Environment, in PAYING FOR PRODUCTIVITY 183-243 (Alan S. Blinder ed., 1990).
27. See generally Aoki, supra note 26.
28. The Department of Labor concedes that, in general, defined contribution plan provisions
binding a trustee to the beneficiaries' instructions on voting and tendering are permissible, but it
insists that there are some situations in which a trustee cannot rely on instructions, for example
where the instructions appear to be influenced by employer pressure or where they concern "unallocated" shares in leveraged ESOPs. Moreover, in the common situation where trustees appoint an
investment manager for the fund, the Department interprets ERISA to preclude binding beneficiary
instructions to the manager on voting. The Department also maintains that ERISA precludes plan
provisions requiring trustees to vote shares for which no instructions are received in proportion to
the votes on shares for which instructions are received. Department of Labor, Opinion Letter on
Tender Offers (Polaroid), 16 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 390 (1989); Department of Labor, Opinion Letter on
Profit Sharing Retirement Income Plan for the Employees of Carter Hawley Hale Stores, 11 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 391 (1988) [hereinafter "Carter Hawley Hale letter"].
For a treatment of these and related control issues from an economic democracy perspective,
see Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and Passivity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1993).
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can lead to costly squabbling and paralysis. And conflicting interests
may lead some worker beneficiaries to defect and ally themselves with
other constituencies such as nonworker investors or creditors in ways
that subvert worker control and/or inhibit the formation of a distinctively worker-oriented investment policy.
The more important potential conflicts grow out of the diverging
interests possessed by workers in different positions within the firm and
in varying stages of employment.2 9
A. Retirees Versus Current Employees
The assets of a defined benefit plan typically secure the claims of
both retired workers receiving benefits and current employees who will
not receive benefits until retirement. The potential for conflict arises
from the fact that the typical retiree will be interested exclusively in the
value of the shares in the fund, while the typical employee will be interested in a variety of enterprise policies that affect employment. Thus, if
wage cuts and layoffs will improve profitability, the retiree has an interest
in implementing them, while the interest of employees in profitability
often will be outweighed by wage and employment considerations.30
The potential for conflicts of interest between current employees and
retirees was illustrated in the 1950s, when John L. Lewis had the United
Mineworkers pension fund purchase shares in Northeastern utilities, intending to influence them to purchase union-mined coal, which arguably
would have benefitted current employees. The District Court for the
District of Columbia held that this was a breach of the trustees' common
law fiduciary duty, presumably toward retirees. 3' In the mid-1970s, New
York City's public employee pension plan purchased large amounts of
low-rated bonds from the financially distressed City. In Withers v.
Teachers' Retirement System, 32 retirees charged a breach of fiduciary
duty, arguing that the purchases were motivated by a desire to obviate
employee layoffs.3 3 The court conceded that such a motive would have
been improper, but rejected the challenge, finding that the purchase was
justified by the fear that, if the bonds were not sold, the City would become bankrupt and default on payments to the fund, thus harming retirees and employees (future retirees) alike. 34
Some Labor Department officials believe that ERISA's fiduciary
norms codify the premise of these non-ERISA cases: the trustee's duties
29. See generally John H. Langbein & Daniel Fischel, ERISA's Fundamental Contribution:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1105 (1988).
30. Id. at 1120-21.
31.
Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089, 1094-95 (D.D.C. 1971).
32. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mere. 595 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1978).
33. Id. at 1254.
34. Id. at 1256.
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are to the interest of all beneficiaries in the soundness of the funds; benefits to working beneficiaries through their employment are not legitimate
concerns, at least if they require a trade-off in terms of returns to the
fund. 3
This conclusion seems at the least debatable. Proponents argue that
the statute is concerned exclusively with retirement security. However,
the statute does not interfere with the ability of employers and workers to
trade off retirement benefits for current economic welfare in setting the
terms of compensation. True, once the terms are set, the statute largely
precludes workers from using pension accumulations for current consumption. But it seems unlikely that this provision reflects a legislative
judgment that retirement interests always should trump current economic interests. Legislative concern about worker short-sightedness or
self-indulgence might be weaker where the worker wants to trade retirement security for job security than where he wants to trade it for current
consumption. Moreover, one might generalize a point in the Withers
case and deny any clean trade-off between job and retirement security,
since a job is a pre-requisite for continued retirement savings, as well as
for current consumption.3 6 At the very least, where a large gain in jobrelated benefits for some workers could be achieved at a small cost to the
fund as a whole, it seems unreasonable to require that such a gain be
foregone.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a fund designed to exploit the full
possibilities of control in the interest of active workers is likely to create
severe conflicts with retirees. There is, however, a solution to this problem. The interests of workers can be severed from the fund on retirement. This is now typically done under defined contribution plans. A
retiring beneficiary may take her stock and become an individual shareholder, or she may receive an annuity equal to the value of her interest,
or a lump sum cash payment. She thus ceases to have an interest in the
fund, and the possibility of conflicts with employee interests is avoided.
Though defined benefit plan beneficiaries typically remain dependent on
the plan after retirement, these plans could in principle be restructured to
allow separation on retirement as well.
B.

Senior Versus Junior Workers

A related conflict arises between senior and junior workers. In a
mature plan, senior workers will tend to have stakes and perspectives
35.

Ian D. Lanoff, The Social Investment of Private Pension Plan Assets: May It Be Done Law-

fully Under ERISA?, 31 LAB. L.J. 387, 389 (1980).
36. Withers, 447 F. Supp. at 1259 (concluding that bond purchases that increased risk to fund
assets but reduced risk of employer bankruptcy and hence lost future contributions were consistent
with purpose of fund to secure beneficiaries' retirement interests).
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different from junior ones. Senior workers will be more intensely concerned about preserving and enhancing retirement benefits; they will be
less concerned about the long-term prospects of the firm, and they will be
less fearful of layoffs (both because seniority protects them and because
the value of continued employment is lower to them as their expected
tenure is shorter). 37 Their views on issues such as layoffs that increase
profitability will be much closer to those of retirees than to those of junior workers.
Moreover, depending on how a plan is structured, senior workers
often will have accumulated far larger shareholdings than junior workers. This may create problems regarding the distribution of control in
enterprise-focus funds. If control is distributed in proportion to financial
stake, senior workers will have much more than juniors. But if control is
distributed on a one-person-one-vote basis, there is a risk that junior
workers will disrespect seniors' investment preferences (for example, by
voting for excessive wages or expansion projects that might generate jobs
while posing a high risk of capital loss).
One response to these problems would be to try to smooth differences in shareholdings in the employing enterprise by permitting or requiring senior employees to diversify their holdings. The ERISA
requirements for ESOPs give workers the option of diversifying after ten
years of employment or upon reaching age 55, whichever occurs first.
During the first five years after this milestone, beneficiaries can instruct
the trustee to invest twenty-five percent of their accounts outside their
own companies; in the sixth year, they can raise this portion to fifty percent.3" This diversification serves two purposes: it responds to the relatively greater risk aversion of the senior employees, and it limits
employee inequality in shareholdings in the employer company.
C.

Managers Versus Rank-And-File Employees

A third axis of potential conflict of interest is between highly paid
employees and senior managers on the one hand and rank-and-file workers on the other. High earners are more inclined (and better able) to save
and invest than are low earners. This general tendency is intensified by
the American tax system's practice of subsidizing pension savings
through tax deductions, which are more valuable to taxpayers in higher
brackets. Thus, high earners will favor larger pension benefits than low
earners, and even if contributions are made at uniform percentages of
workers' earnings, high earners will acquire larger stakes in pension
funds.
Because of this tendency, managers have vastly disproportionate fi37.
38.

Langbein & Fischel, supra note 29, at 1120-21.
26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(28)(B) (West Supp. 1993).
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nancial interests in many nominally employee-owned firms, and sometimes complete control over those enterprises. In such situations, rankand-file workers tend to experience no difference in their role in the firm
following transition to employee ownership, and labor disputes indistinguishable from those in investor-owned firms frequently have arisen.3 9
The best publicized recent ESOP adoptions in large public corporations were initiated by management as takeover defenses.' ° The democratic potential of ESOPs often is subverted under these circumstances.
Managers count on employees to support them in takeover contests, relying on workers' fears that new owners will initiate wage or job cuts.
Such considerations are often legitimate employee concerns, but it is disturbing that ESOPs, while inhibiting assumption of control by outsiders,
typically do not effectively reduce management's own ability to initiate
wage and job cuts. And while they limit the ability of outside investors
to discipline managerial incompetence or self-indulgence, they typically
do not give employee-shareholders the ability to do so.
I will address below issues concerning the connection between ownership and control, but a separate set of problems arises from the concentration of ownership among the workplace elite. The tax code attempts
to respond to this problem with constraints on inequality in pension contributions known as "nondiscrimination" and "top heavy" rules.4" For
example, under the latter a plan must provide no more than 60 percent of
its benefits to defined "key" elite workers or must meet specified alternative standards designed to constrain inequality.4 2 The law also sets caps
on tax-subsidized amounts which can be contributed on behalf of any one
employee.4 3
However, these rules constrain inequality only very loosely. They
permit the wholesale exclusion from participation in pension plans of
part-time workers, newly hired workers, workers under twenty-one and
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.' Thus, many ESOPs exclude entirely more than half the relevant workforce. For those
included, contributions proportional to salary are not considered discriminatory.4 5 In fact, many plans take advantage of the option afforded
by the rules on "integration" of pension and Social Security benefits to
make contributions on the basis of larger fractions of salary for higher
39.

South Bend Lathe and Vermont Asbestos are well-known examples of such situations. See

KEITH BRADLEY & ALAN GELB, WORKER CAPITALISM: THE NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 102-

05 (1988).
40. E.g., NCR Corp. v. AT & T, 761 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ohio 1991); Shamrock Holdings, Inc.
v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989).
41. 26 U.S.C.A. § 416 (West Supp. 1993).
42.
43.
44.
45.

26 U.S.C.A. § 416(g)(1).
26 U.S.C.A. § 415(b) (West Supp. 1993).
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 401(a)(26)(B)(ii), 410(a)(l), 410(b)(3)(A), 410(b)(4)(B).
See BLASI, supra note 6, at 47.
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paid employees than for lower paid ones.4 6
Tightening such rules could mitigate the inequality problem.
Changing the tax benefit 47 from a deduction from taxable income to a
credit against the tax payment would tend to equalize its value to high
and low earners. The inclusion of all non-probationary workers could be
required, as could contributions at uniform fractions of salary, perhaps
with a fixed dollar maximum based on the relevant fraction of the median worker's salary. However, inequality constraints can have the disadvantage that they make affected benefits available to an individual
worker turn on the wages of the people with whom she works; for example, low-wage employees in workforces with many high-wage workers
often end up with higher contributions than they might like and would
get in a workforce where they represented a larger fraction. 8 Obviously,
the more equal the underlying wage distribution, the less severe this
problem. In addition, the more effectively control arrangements allow
workers with diverse preferences to articulate them and have them considered in determining the design of compensation arrangements, the less
severe tax distortions will be.
D.

Division of Labor

Finally, we should note conflicts arising from the division of labor.
The more rigid and extensive the division of labor, the greater the potential for conflicts arising from different work roles. With a rigid, stratified
division of labor comes a relatively strong potential for conflict over such
issues as relative compensation, technological changes that enhance productivity but eliminate certain work roles or product choice (where only
certain workers are able to work on certain products). Henry Hansmann
argues that the extent of the division of labor is the most important determinant of the viability of worker control.4 9
This point may be overstated. The same conflict that Hansmann
sees as widely impeding effective worker ownership would seem equally
to impede effective union collective bargaining. While the American
46.

Id. at 39-52.

47. "Qualified" pension plans-those that comply with the various statutory conditions-receive three basic benefits: (a) The employer secures a current tax deduction for the contribution, 26
U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1993); (b) the employee is not taxed on contributions or fund
earnings until distribution, 26 U.S.C.A. § 402(a)(1); and (c) the fund is exempt from tax on its
investment income, 26 U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(9). "Leveraged" ESOPs, which purchase stock with employer-guaranteed loans, receive additional benefits, including employer deductibility of loan repayments (both principal and interest). If the ESOP owns more than half the outstanding stock, the
lender may exclude 50% of the interest payments from its income. 26 U.S.C.A. § 133.
48. See Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-Discrimination Provisions Desirable?,55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 821-25 (1988).
49. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?: ESOPs, Law Firms.
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1747, 1783-84 (1990).
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economy may not have experienced much successful worker ownership,
it has in some periods seen a great deal of effective collective bargaining.
Nevertheless, it seems plausible that worker ownership is compatible
with the kind of work organization that trains workers in diverse, general
skills and either narrows the range of positions or rotates workers
through the fullest feasible range of occupations. We do not know, however, to what extent this type of work organization is technologically
plausible. Both theory and experience recently have challenged many
deep-rooted assumptions on this point and suggest that the range of possible tasks is broader than previously thought.5 °
While there are plausible mitigating responses to the retiree/employee, senior worker/junior worker and manager/rank-and-file
worker conflicts, these responses-severing retiree interests, diversifying
funds, and limiting contributions on behalf of high-wage workers-all
tend to reduce the pool of savings available for concentrated industry- or
enterprise-focused funds.
III
CONTROL

The economic democracy norm contemplates worker control, but
pension fund beneficiaries are not necessarily full-fledged owners, and
even full-fledged ownership rights to capital often carry very limited control rights.
A. Scope Of Control Rights
As noted above, according to the Labor Department's interpretation
of ERISA, the statute imposes broad paternalistic duties on ESOP trustees which limit their ability to respect beneficiary instructions. 5 Scandalously, the ESOP tax legislation permits privately held companies to
appoint plan trustees (often managers themselves) who can exercise voting power without consulting beneficiaries, except with respect to major
"organic" changes (for example, mergers, sales-of-all-assets, stock exchanges, recapitalizations and liquidations). 52 Thus, ESOP beneficiaries
in privately held companies can be denied the basic shareholder right of
voting for the enterprise's directors. 3
50. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE 251-80
(1984).
51. See supra note 28.
52. 26 U.S.C.A. § 409(e)(3) (West Supp. 1993).
53. One important benefit to leveraged ESOPs-plans in which the stock is purchased with
borrowed money-requires that all voting rights be passed through to beneficiaries in private, as well
as in public companies. 26 U.S.C.A. § 133(b)(7). However, in leveraged ESOPs, voting is passed
through only to the extent that the loan has been repaid. See Department of Labor, Carter Hawley
Hale letter, supra note 28.
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Moreover, while shareholder rights may be adequate to protect the
interests of outside investors, the possession of these rights- even if fully
passed through to beneficiaries-is insufficient to attain the goals of any
ambitious conception of worker control. Shareholders can elect the directors and approve "organic" changes, but typically that is the extent of
their power. Thus, if workers are to be given control over shop floor
issues or over any strategic decisions with respect to their companies
(e.g., investment, marketing, workforce level) other than the basic "organic" ones, they must be entitled to forms of participation other than
those routinely accorded shareholders.
B.

Initiation and Termination

A failing in some respects more serious than the limited participation afforded by ESOPs themselves, is the complete absence of participation afforded employees in connection with the adoption and termination
of plans. Unless a workforce is unionized, employers unilaterally can
institute ESOPs on their own terms, and unless the ESOPs give employees more control than is typically the case, employers unilaterally can
terminate them as well.
One approach to remedying these defects would be to condition tax
subsidies on the creation of participatory structures which are more
meaningful than those associated with conventional stock ownership.
Since labor law provides one example of such a structure, one might
make the subsidy available only to unionized workplaces. Such a measure would have some affinity with "corporatist" labor law models in
which unionization is encouraged and strengthened by conditioning benefits on unionization and giving unions a role in administering them.54
However, this approach is probably not politically viable in the United
States, at least not in the near future.
A more modest measure would provide that the inauguration or termination of a tax-subsidized ESOP could be accomplished only with the
consent of a majority of the employees in a vote that met stipulated procedural requirements. The very process of coming together to consider
the initiation of the plan might generate employee relations and organization that would persist after its inauguration. Alternatively, the tax code
could define and mandate some such organization in terms less ambitious
than those defining unions, perhaps an elected workers' council charged
with coordinating the exercise of share voting rights.
54. Tamara Lothian, The Political Consequences of Labor Law Regimes: The Contractualist
and CorporatistModels Compared, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001, 1008-11 (1986).
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C. Distribution of Voting Rights
Another set of issues concerns the allocation of voting power in relation to shareholdings. Presumably, each share carries an equal vote, so
the more unequally shares are distributed, the more unequal their voting
power. But economic democracy norms suggest that, even where unequal financial returns are justified, unequal voting is not. Union voting
structures traditionally are organized on a one-person/one-vote basis
(federal labor law requires this)." In unionized settings, an ESOP with
unequal voting power would violate the principle of equal voting rights
(though not any legal requirements, since the labor law equality requirement applies only to internal union procedures). It also would channel
the shareholders' control process outside the union structure.
A further concern is whether workers should vote individually or
collectively. If there are outside shareholders, or management has large
holdings, or workers are divided into recognizable constituencies, individual voting may lead workers to divide their votes in ways that generally are counter-productive to their group interests. Even if all workers
fare best when they vote their shares as a unit, individual workers occasionally may see an interest in short-term alliances with other constituencies, and once ranks are broken in this fashion, the cohesion needed for
effective voting may be lost permanently.
Voting trusts have been used to respond to concerns about both
equal voting and vote splitting in a few union-led ESOPs. 56 For example,
the trustee can be instructed to vote all the shares as directed by the
union pursuant to a majority vote on a one-per-person basis.57 Whether
ERISA will be construed to permit such arrangements remains to be
seen.
D.

Control in Diversified Plans

So far, I have assumed that the pension plans discussed focused on
the workers' own enterprise, as do ESOPs. Control possibilities also exist
for diversified plans. Some large diversified plans have beneficiaryelected trustees, including two enormous ones: the California Public Employees' Retirement System and TIAA-CREF, the private teachers'
fund.58 Experience so far, however, does not suggest that beneficiary
participation is very meaningful in these cases. Voter participation rates
are low, elections are not contested, and candidates do not run on sub55.
56.
57.

29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a)(1) (1985).
See Olson, supra note 10, at 753-60 (discussing the case of Rath Meatpacking).
Id. at 757-58.

58.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20100 (West Supp. 1993); TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY

ASSOCIATION, GOVERNING TIAA AND CREF (1991).
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stantive platforms. The investment decisions of these plans seem generally comparable to those without participant voting.
One problem relates to a consequence of diversification: holdings are
spread among a wide variety of enterprises and represent only a small
fraction of the equity of each. 9 The issues that will arise in such plans
will be more remote to the worker, and the plans' influence over those
issues will be less than in the case of the typical issue in an ESOP.
There appear to be two ways of responding to the problem of control dispersion in diversified plans. One would be to narrow the diversification of the fund and focus investments on projects or enterprises that
are related to those of the workers. For example, investments could focus on the workers' own region. Other possibilities include concentrating on local housing investments (a practice that has attracted several
public employee funds), on housing loans for union members (to mention
a program of a Florida local of the Operating Engineers Union that survived an ERISA challenge), or on construction projects that employ
union labor." Alternatively, a union plan might choose to form a venture capital fund targeting experimental enterprises with exceptional potential for job creation or worker participation, with a view toward
selling off its interests once they become successful. 6t
All of these efforts would entail additional risk. On the other hand,
plan fiduciaries might have informational advantages over conventional
lenders in areas of local interest which would mitigate or offset the effects
of lost diversification. The investments also might generate compensating externalities in the form of worker training, or demonstration effects
that would inspire private investors to emulate successful projects,
thereby creating attractive jobs. To the extent that these practices involve additional risk, it is not clear whether ERISA permits them.
An alternative approach to the problem of beneficiary alienation
would be to link the funds to national institutions engaged in broad eco59. ERISA mandates diversification for defined benefit plans. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104(a)(1)(C)
(1988). Many believe that ERISA encourages over-diversification; they argue that the financial ben-

efits of diversification can be attained with considerably fewer investments than plans typically hold.
Nevertheless, even with considerably less diversification, only the largest plans could ever attain
more than a tiny toehold in large companies. See Mark Roe, The Modern Corporationand Private
Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 1993).

60. Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 596 (1 1th Cir. 1986). This plan ran into financial trouble when
Florida real estate values plummeted. See Joel Chernoff, Ego Leads to Dennis Walton's Downfall,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jul. 8, 1991, at 1.
The Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA require joint employer-union control of employerfunded, union-sponsored plans. 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1988). However, since the employer has
no responsibility to guarantee any particular benefit level in a defined contribution plan, it should be
open to responsible "social" investments that have strong worker support.
61. If the fund itself were diversified among a variety of start-ups and were only a small part of
a much larger, more extensively diversified pension fund, the high risk associated with new enterprises might be permissible.
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nomic and political functions, such as labor confederations and electoral
parties. The labor federations of Sweden and West Germany and the
social democratic parties allied with them are examples of such institutions.62 The "wage-earner fund" proposals in those countries seem to
have contemplated that the participatory mechanisms of the union would
spill over into the decisions of the wage-earner funds. The funds were to
be managed by trustees appointed by the state and the unions jointly.
Nevertheless, the mechanisms of worker influence on the fund and the
modes of decisionmaking contemplated are quite vague in the plans.
Moreover, impressive as the Swedish and West German labor federations
are, it is questionable how effectively participatory they are. Thus, we
really do not have a detailed model of how participation would work in a
diversified fund.
The history of the Swedish supplementary ATP pension funding
mechanism provides a sobering suggestion that unions strong enough to
coordinate worker pension control rights in order to achieve nonfinancial
goals may not wish to do so. The ATP program provided for wagerelated pensions supplementing the basic flat grant pension provided
under the original Swedish social security program. Unlike the flat grant
program, under which current program claims were financed by current
program income, the supplemental one was to be funded-that is, funds
would be set aside and accumulated in anticipation of future claims. The
supplemental program was to be financed by employment taxes paid into
four funds managed by boards composed equally of labor, management
and public representatives. Inaugurated in 1959, these funds have become major players in the Swedish capital markets. During the 1960s,
they accounted for between a quarter and a third of new long-term investment and credit. This fraction has declined as the need to pay retiring beneficiaries has caused the funds to cash out increasing portions of
their holdings.
Notably, neither unions nor labor representatives on the fund
boards have shown any interest in incorporating nonfinancial criteria
into fund investment decisions. Indeed, during the 1960s when the
Swedish government sought to marshall credit on favorable terms to
housing as part of a massive social program of housing expansion, the
funds resisted on the ground that they could obtain higher financial returns elsewhere. 63 The labor movement seems to have believed that "social investment" could best be accomplished through the state, rather
than itself, and independent of the system of retirement finance.
In America, the "corporate campaigns" of some unions, including,
62.
63.

See, e.g., SWENSON, supra note 7, at 156-72, 185-216.
See generally JONAS PONTUSSON, PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS

TAL FORMATION IN SWEDEN (1984).
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notably, the textile and mine workers, provide one illustration of how
pension fund socialism might be linked to traditional union functions. In
a corporate campaign, the union seeks to increase pressure on an enterprise whose workers it is organizing or on behalf of whom it is bargaining
by using its status as a creditor, shareholder or customer of either the
target enterprise or some institution that is a creditor, shareholder, or
customer of the target enterprise. The prospect that worker pension
holdings might be employed in this manner on a broad scale has excited
some visionaries. 64 But, given diversified funds, such strategies would be
practical only if coordinated by labor federations with strong central control and broad coverage. Such institutions do not exist in the United
States.
More modestly, one might consider establishing for employee
groups coordinating institutions along the lines proposed by Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman for mainstream institutional investors.6 5 A
group of diversified funds might sponsor an independent nonprofit corporation to research companies, recommend votes on contested shareholder
voting issues, and field candidates for boards. The sponsoring funds presumably would follow the lead of the nonprofit and, when their holdings
were aggregated, might achieve considerable influence.6 6
Again, the lack of interest among the stronger European labor
movements in using retirement finance to gain leverage in organizing and
bargaining is sobering. The most obvious reason for their lack of interest
is lack of need. These organizations are strong enough to obtain their
organizing and bargaining goals without putting their members' retirement capital at risk. This makes the "corporate campaign" type of pension fund socialism seem more like a provisional and tactical response to
circumstances of weak union organization and an unsupportive state
than a model for the ultimate socialization of the investment process.
Of course, there exist serious paternalistic and social welfare issues
regarding the extent to which workers should be encouraged to politicize
investment decisions in retirement programs. Moreover, if there is to be
politics, it should take the form of general principles legislated by beneficiaries but implemented by disinterested fiduciaries. The funds should
not become either slush funds for union leaders or charitable trusts in
64.

See generally RIFKIN & BARBER, supra note 6.

65. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
InstitutionalInvestors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
66. Id. Since federal law permits unions to control member pension funds only through boards
on which employers are equally represented, 29 U.S.C.A. § 186(c)(5)(B), such strategies would require the acquiescence of employer representatives. Such acquiescence hardly could be routinely
presumed, but as Rifkin & Barber point out, the interests of unionized employers and employees
would coincide on some important issues. Unionized employers are generally sympathetic to efforts
to organize and improve working conditions for their competitors' employees. RIFKIN & BARBER,
supra note 6, at 222-23.
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which claims of sentiment routinely trump interests of fiscal soundness
and reasonable return on investment.6 7
IV
REDISTRIBUTION

America apparently owes its ESOP tax subsidy to the influence of
the theories of the maverick financier Louis Kelso on Senator Russell
Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee at the time the subsidy
was enacted. Like his father Huey, Russell Long was an exponent of a
peculiar brand of populism that attacked large corporations in the name
of the toiling masses but sometimes performed its most effective services
for wealthy "independent" businessmen. (Among Russell Long's other
legacies is a set of oil production tax subsidies for the likes of J.R. Ewing.) Kelso suggested that ESOPs could accomplish a massive redistribution, turning the country from a nation of plutocratic absentee
investors to one of yeoman worker-owners. 68
This seems implausible. Of course, workers pay for ESOP shares
and other pension benefits through lower wages, higher taxes (the tax
subsidy is largely regressive) and/or lower employment rates. This
trade-off does not itself make workers richer except to the extent it creates incentives for greater productivity, and even in that case labor does
not necessarily capture a greater portion of the increased wealth than
lenders, outside shareholders, or managers. Pension policy might encourage a more egalitarian distribution in the long run if it induced the
nonrich to save more than the rich. But, as I noted above, the thrust of
American pension policy is generally in the opposite direction. The
trend toward pension fund socialism has not been accompanied by any
marked equalization in the distribution of capital ownership.
Thus, an ambitiously redistributive pension program will have to
look outside American pension programs for models, and here the European social democratic "wage-earner fund" plans, notably the one formulated by Rudolf Meidner, chief economist of the Swedish blue collar
labor federation (the LO), are of interest.69 Meidner proposed financing
his wage-earner funds through a profits tax, rather than through wagebased contributions. He argued that this approach had the virtues of
avoiding the employment disincentive effects of high wage-based benefits,
avoiding driving marginal firms out of business, and enabling labor to
67.

See RALPH C. JAMES & ESTELLE DINERSTEIN JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS 213-

317 (1965) (chronicling the misuse of Teamster pension savings during the Hoffa era for both cronyism and ill-conceived "social investment").
68. For a useful synthesis, see generally Robert H.A. Ashford, The Binary Economics of Louis
Kelso: The Promise of Universal Capitalism, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 3 (1990).
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RUDOLF MEIDNER, EMPLOYEE INVESTMENT FUNDS:
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capture a substantial portion of the rents of more successful firms withpolicies designed to limit inequality
out abandoning "solidaristic" wage
70
firms.
across
compensation
in
The Meidner plan was designed to gradually socialize Swedish capital. It proposed a twenty percent profits tax on firms above a minimum
size. The tax was to be paid in the form of shares held by diversified
union-managed funds. The scheme contemplated that eventually the
funds would acquire control of all the large private enterprises in the
economy. The pace of socialization would depend on the profitability of
the firms. In a firm earning five percent a year on its capital, the funds
would acquire a controlling interest in seventy-five years; in a firm earning a fifteen percent annual return, the funds would acquire control
within thirty-five years. Eventually, the funds would own all large enterprises entirely.71
In effect, the plan socializes investment through a combination of
radically differential taxes on capitalist and worker investment (the tax
rate on profits is uniform, but the share contribution to the funds rebates
the tax on worker investment) and forced savings by workers. In the
programmatic repertory of socialism, the Meidner plan is distinctive in
its combination of radicalism of goal and gradualism of implementation.
The Meidner plan was not proposed as a form of pension fund socialism. The returns to the funds were to be used for collective consumption, worker training, unemployment benefits, and union organizing
expenses. The plan's proponents may have been influenced by the rejection of social investment in the supplementary pension (ATP) plan. Nevertheless the proposed targeting of investment proceeds in the plan seems
odd. If the plan ever proceeded to the ultimate conclusion Meidner envisioned, it would hold a far larger fraction of social wealth than would be
rational to devote to these purposes.
The broader versions of the plan met with political defeat; only a
shrunken version was enacted, with little prospect of having significant
systemic impact on investment practices. Nevertheless, the plan seems
far more plausible than the Kelso/Long approach as an engine of redistributive transformation.
V
BACKGROUND ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS

The viability of pension fund socialist projects depends in substan70. Id. at 106-19.
71. Of course, this timetable would depend on the funds' payout policies. If the funds were
used for retirement finance-and there were no population growth-one would expect the funds'
growth to level out at the point when the last of the first generation of workers had retired and begun
to draw their pensions. At that point, contributions would be roughly balanced by payments.
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tial part on a variety of background economic factors. Unfortunately,
some of these factors, as they occur in the American economy, make the
United States a relatively unfavorable setting for the more ambitious of
72
such undertakings.
Investment risk As noted above, investment tends to be riskier in
the United States than elsewhere. For that reason, pension fund socialism would require American workers to assume greater risks with their
retirement savings here than elsewhere and thus will seem less attractive.
Social insurance. The less generous social insurance programs are,
less
investment risk workers can afford to take with their private savthe
ings (though more generous social insurance programs are likely to require taxation that will leave workers with less income for private
savings). American social insurance programs are relatively meager.
Wage inequality. The more wage inequality, the harder it is to design programs that preserve the socialist equality goal. Either fund contributions must be subjected to progressively more restrictive limits for
higher income workers (thus limiting the available investment pool) or
control and/or income rights must be detached from wages/
contributions (thus limiting the incentive effects of wage differentials).
The United States has a relatively high degree of income inequality.
Politicalinfrastructure. Where there is a strong union/party structure with wide coverage with which pension fund control procedures can
be integrated, the problem of effectively democratizing control measures
is less severe. The United States has a relatively weak union/party structure from which much of the population is alienated and excluded.
VI
CONCLUSION

The more ambitious forms of pension fund socialism promise workers a tolerable risk on their investment, a voice in decisions about the
enterprises in which their funds own an equity interest, and a more equitable share of the economy's capital income. Unfortunately, there are
numerous political, legal and economic obstacles standing in the way of
pension fund socialism. In this article, I have identified those obstacles
which seem most intractable. At the level of large, diversified funds, the
prospects of pension fund socialism are hampered by the difficulty of providing meaningful avenues of democratic participation to large, dispersed
constituencies. In many industries, enterprise- or industry-focused funds
probably could achieve some of the goals of pension fund socialism, such
as extending worker control over the workplace. However, except in the
72. See generally Aoki, supra note 26; Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections
on the Distinctive Characterof American Labor Laws", 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1.
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most stable and skilled labor-intensive industries, such funds are unlikely
to attain anything approaching majority control of enterprises. While we
should not abandon the pursuit of pension fund socialism, it is unlikely
that pension reform will obviate the need for other means of worker ownership and protection.

